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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE V. ROBINSON, ) 




CHESTER WHITELAW, \ 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case 
No. 9377 
})f s {& Jl/ P~IV/ 
BRIEF OF i\PPELLJ\NTS , 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint states generally that 
the plaintiff and the defendant are neighbors in the area 
of Beryl, Iron County, Utah; that each cleared his own 
land sometime ago, and thereafter dust has on occasion 
blown from the land of the defendant onto the land of 
the plaintiff. There is no allegation of affirmative action 
of the defendant in any manner creating this situation, 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and the only item complained of by the plaintiff perform-
ed by the defendant is the act of clearing land in approx-
imately 1947. Now, fourteen years later he is complaining 
because the defendant cleared land. 
The defendant filed a motion for dismissal on the 
ground that the amended complaint failed to state a 
cause of action against the defendant for which the court 
can give redress or take jurisdiction, and on the further 
ground that this cause of action is barred by the follow-
ing statutes, to-wit, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 78-12-25 
and 78-12-26. 
After the filing of this motion, same was duly called 
for hearing on the 13th day of September, 1960, and 
the court indicated that it was the court's intention to 
dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint, and to give 
plaintiff's attorney an opportunity to amend same. Plain-
tiff's attorney stated that he desired not to amend same, 
and thereupon the judgment of dismissal was duly en-
tered. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point I 
The trial court did not err when it granted the mo-
tion to dismiss on the ground that the amended com-
plaint failed to state a cause of action against the defend-
ant. 
Point II 
The trial court did not err when it granted the mo-
tion to dismiss on the ground that the cause .of action 
was barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT 
GRANTED THE MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE 
GROUND THAT THE Al\1ENDED COMPLAINT FAILED 
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DE-
FENDANT. 
It is to be noted that unless the decision of the trial 
court is upheld in this matter, any person who farms a 
piece of ground and then for any reason satisfactory to 
him, fails to continue farming same, may be subject to 
an action of the type attempted to be initiated herein by 
the plaintiff. 
Although extensive research was done by the under-
signed, the undersigned fails to find any case in which 
the natural dust in itself has been held to be a nuisance. 
Although the undersigned found many cases in which 
items added to the dust had an influence thereon, in 
cases where blasting and processing of soils were held to 
be a nuisance, the undersigned failed to find any case 
where natural dust without adulteration in any fashion 
was held to be a nuisance. Apparently the plaintiff and 
appellant has had the same experience. He has cited no 
cases in which natural dust is held to be a nuisance. 
The closest case found by the undersigned for dust 
being held a nuisance without something being added to 
it was the case of Mcintosh v. Brimmer, 68 Cal. App. 770, 
230 Pac. 203. This is a situation whereby plaintiff alleged 
maintenance in a chicken farm operation whereby the 
chickens scratched the soil and dust blew onto the plain-
tiff's property arising from the scratching by the chick-
ens. It was held that this was .a nuisance. This is a very 
interesting case inasmuch as in the decision the holdings 
showed, and the evidence held this finding: 
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" :x, * * Dust blown from the defendant's chicken cor-
rals into the plaintiff's grapes was not a pure soil, 
but was impregnated with effuvia of the nature of 
humous." . 
The implication from this case is that if it had been pure 
soil there would have been no nuisance. Apparently, in 
this California case, which is the strongest the under-
signed has found, it took the addition of the effuvia from 
the chickens to make a nuisance. In the case of Mcintosh 
v. Brimmer there is a reference to the ruling of the Chan-
celor in the case of St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping 
(11 H.L. Cas 642). in the Mcintosh Case, the California 
court recognizes the Chancellor's ruling in the St. Helen's 
Smelting Co. v. Tipping case as the outstanding author-
ity in the matter of nuisance. The Mcintosh case, pur-
porting to quote from the St. Helen's Smelting Co. case, 
makes the following quotation: 
" * * * It seems but reasonable and just that the 
neighbor who has brought something on his own 
property, which was not naturally there, harmless to 
others so long as it is confined to his own property, 
but which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on 
his neighbor's, should be obliged to make good the 
damage which ensues if he does not succeed in con-
fining it to his own property. 
"We think this to be the law, whether the things so 
brought be beasts, or water, or filth, or stenches." 
This ruling which the Mcintosh case has incorpor-
ated from the St. Helen's Smelting Co. case apparently 
explains the reason why the undersigned and opposing 
counsel have failed to find any direct ruling in connec-
tion with dust alone being blown from an individual's 
property onto a neighbor's property. There is the impli-
cation in the Mcintosh case that dust alone is not a nui-
sance, and the reference of the Mcintosh case to the St. 
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Helen's Smelting Co. case and the adoption therein of 
the ruling propounded by the Chancellor in the St. Hel-
en's Smelting Co. case, apparently limit nuisance to that 
which is brought onto the property and not kept there. 
There is no question that the cases are legion in which 
under certain conditions beasts, water, and filth have 
been brought onto property and then allowed to get onto 
a neighbor's property, and have the·n been held to be 
nuisances. Under some conditions, stenches have been 
held to be nuisances when not confined to the place they 
originated, and when they were caused by something 
brought onto the property. The undersigned has failed 
to find any sort of a case where a stench originating on 
property from natural causes has been held to be a nui-
sance. The undersigned has been unable to find any case 
where dust, except as created by some manufacturing 
process or some commercial enterprise, has been held to 
be a nuisance. It seems that with most nuisance cases 
accepting the St. Helen's Smelting Co. case as the emin-
e·nt authority for nuisance, these items originating on the 
property from natural causes have been intentionally 
omitted from the nuisance doctrine. They certainly do 
not come under the rule laid down in the St. Helen's 
Smelting Co. case whkh is based on something being 
brought onto the property and then not confined there. 
The plaintiff and appellant places great emphasis on 
the Ute Stampede Case, 142 Pac. 2d 690 (Utah), (which 
the undersigned found at Page 670) which certainly is 
not in point. However, it is noted that in this Ute Stam-
pede case, action was brought under Utah Code anno-
tated, 1943, Title 104-56-1, and following. The undersigned 
is of the opinion that the 1949 Legislature repealed this 
particular group of statutes, and that same have not 
been re-enacted. 
The Dunsbach v. Hollister case, decided in 1888, re-
ported in 30 N. E. 1152, and in 3 A.L.R. 318, mentioned 
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by counsel on Page 9 of appellant's brief, generally sets 
forth a fact situation in which other materials have been 
brought onto the lot and then blown off. Certainly this 
is not in point with the case at bar. The annotation on 
this particular case in 3 A.L.R. beginning at Page 310 
and running through Page 324 inclusive, which includes 
the portion on Page 318 quoted by counsel, has a consid-
erable annotation on dust as a nuisance. In this A.L.R. 
annotation, it is based entirely upon industrial dust cre-
ated by a business of some sort moved onto the proper-
ty, such as a cotton gin, which was the primary case in-
volved, a blacksmith shop, a carpet cleaning plant, a 
coal or coke handling shop, electric light plant, a factory, 
a flour mill, a lime kiln, a sand pile, stonework handling, 
a threshing machine, a woodworking plant, a copper pol-
ishing plant, a saw mill, or a stonecutting plant. In all 
instances in this annotation 3 A.L.R. which counsel de-
pends upon, something in addition was moved onto the 
property, not just natural dirt left there. 
The item cited by counsel on Page 10 of plaintiff's 
brief, as 11 A.L.R. 1402, goes into a situation whereby 
the defendant was using his property on which to stack 
other materials that blew onto a neighbor's property. It 
is again noted that this comes from the decision of the 
St. Helen's Smelting Co. case advanced in the California 
courts in the case of Mcintosh v. Brimmer previously 
cited, which is often called "The Chicken. Case." In the 
item cited by counsel in plaintiff's brief, the sand was 
hauled onto the property and allowed to blow off. Also, 
this was in a very restricted, highly industrialized and 
residential area, and was not in a farming area. If the 
action at bar is allowed, one cannot help but wonder at 
what point the next farmer downwind from plaintiff will 
commence an action against the plaintiff on the same 
theory as the action now before the court. 
There are many cases that hold that even when 
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items are brought unto the property they are nut nui-
sances. One of the strongest in this regard is the case 
of Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe RR. v. Armstrong, which 
was in the Supreme Court of Kansas on 6 May 1905, cited 
as 80 Pac. 978, 71 Kansas 366. In this case there was a 
situation whereby a railroad had bee·n going along a 
right-of-way adjacent to the property of Mr. Armstrong. 
They lowered the bed so that the top of the smoke stacks 
was even with the ground, thereafter, the smoke from 
the various smoke stacks passed into the home and prem-
ises of Armstrong, and he brought the action for dam-
ages and for abatement. The Kansas Supreme Court held 
that an authorized business, properly conducted at an 
authorized place is not a nuisance, 
" * «, * for whatever is lawful cannot be wrongful, 
and the owner of a railroad thus organized and oper-
ated does not level damages to any residences per-
meated by smoke, cinders and gas emitted from the 
engines to such an extent as to be injurious to the 
health and comfort of the inhabitants." 
The Kansas Supreme Court held further that one whose 
residence is rendered uncomfortable or unhealthy to the 
occupants by smoke, cinders and gas emitted from the 
locomotive engines of a railway company, cannot recov-
er damages therefor, in the absence of any constitutional 
or statutory authority, where it appears that such com-
pany has not abused or exceeded its authority in locating 
or constructing the railroad track in the operation of 
its engines. 
In the matter of Dahl v. Utah Oil Refining Company, 
Supreme Court of Utah, 20 June 1927, 262 Pac. 269, 71 
Utah 1, the trial court filed a verdict of $500 for the plain-
tiff. The Supreme Court reversed this, holding: "This is 
held not to be an actionable· nuisance." The court held 
that discomfort caused by impregnation of atmosphere 
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within a manufacturing community, by disagreeable 
odors and impurities, without injury to life or health, 
does not constitute a nuisance as a matter of law. It 
holds further that the operation of a modern, well-equip-
ped oil refinery in an industrial section of a city, accord-
ing to approved methods, a distance of 1000 feet or more 
from a dwelling house to which offensive and disagree-
able fumes or odors, not injurious to life or health, and 
not ~causing any great physical injury or property in-
jury, are occasionally carried, is, as a matter of law, a 
proper use of property. 
Also, in McMullen v. Jennings, 41 Pac. 2d 753, 141 
Kansas 420, decided by the Supreme Court of Kansas 9 
March, 1935, concerning the dust from a grain elevator, 
it was held that this grain elevator was not a nuisance. 
In the case of Mcivor v. Mercer-Fraser Co., 172 Pac. 
2d 578, quoted on Page 11 of plaintiff's brief, the question 
of whether or not a nuisance exists does not arise from 
a question of dust, but arises from the question of excava-
tion in which insufficient land was left to hold plai'ntiff's 
land in position. There is a great difference between the 
case whereby land is excavated and the neighbor's land 
runs into the pit, and in a natural dust question when 
and where the wind blows. 
In the case of Kendall v. Seaman, 63 New York 68, 
20 American Reports 567, the court held that where there 
is a fact situation of a lawful use in a proper area, there 
can be no redress for a claim of careless, extraordinary, 
or unnecessary use of the property. 
In the present case, the defendant has not used his 
land in any fashion that created a nuisance. The only 
thing that plaintiff did was farm his land 14 years ago, 
a·nd let it lie idle since. Can we say that a man must farm 
his land whether or not he feels like doing so, and re-
gardless of his own personal conditions? 
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Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT 
GRANTED THE MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE 
GROUND THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION WAS BAR-
RED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Title 78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides 
that within four years an action must be brought for 
reliefs not otherwise provided by law. 
If counsel claims that this is a trespass upon real 
property, then Title 78-12-26, (1) would apply. It is not-
ed that in this statute, various subsections other than 
(1) pertaining to a 3-year statute of limitations, in many 
fields contain statements that the action will not run 
until the act complained of has been discovered. This 
certainly would not be the case in the matter at bar, in-
asmuch is there is no question that the act complained 
of has been known for in excess of 14 years, and the wind 
has blown in excess of 14 years, according to plaintiff's 
amended complaint. 
The cases are legion that hold that the statute of 
limitations does run. It is noted with interest that counsel 
cites the case of Brede v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co., 
173 N.W. 805. Although this case is not in point with the 
case at bar, it is a question of dust from a quarrying 
op~ration, and from blasting. There w'as an area 
known as the Kletzen tract which had been worked for 
the last two years and was much closer than the other 
areas. The Minnesota court held that this was a nuisa·nce 
and enjoined same, specifically holding that if the defend-
ant were engaged in quarrying on the 40-acre tract only, 
which does not include the Kletzen tract, and was the 
original tract, and was not operating its dust mill on the 
Kletzen tract, the situation would be materially different. 
But the operations on the Kletzen tract and in the dust 
mill were begun only two years prior to the commence-
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ment of this action: 
" * * * Defendant is now blasting nearer to the plain-
tiff's premises than ever before, and is creating dust 
of a new character and in increased quantities. The 
period over which these conditions have extended 
is comparatively short, and no claim of laches can 
be made successfully." 
In this Brede v. Minnesota case, the court indicates that 
were it not for the new operation on the new piece of 
ground within the last two years, this action would not 
lie. 
In the matter of Kinsman v. Utah Gas & Coke Com-
pany, Supreme Court of Utah December 3, 1918, 53 Utah 
10, 177 Pac. 418, an action was brought to enjoin the 
manufacture of gas. It was shown that the plant was 
erected in 1906 and doubled in 1910. The court held that 
the plaintiff was guilty of laches and as such was not 
entitled to an injunction. 
In the ,case of Thomas v. \Voodman, 23, Kansas 217, 
33 American Reports 156, the owner of land below a dam 
in the river built this dam to divert the water into a creek 
for milliing purposes. Thereafter, the plaintiff delayed for 
two or three years after he discovered the water below 
the dam adjacent to his residence became stagnant, be-
fore taking the necessary steps to establish the exist-
ence of an all.edged nuisance caused by such dam, during 
which time the dam was twice washed out and rebuilt. 
The trial court held that he was not entiled to equitable 
relief, and the Supreme Court uphelp this decision. 
In the matter of Gibbs v. Gardner, 80 Pac. 2d 371, 7 
Montana 76, the defendant for a period in excess of twen-
ty years removed water from a ditch by a specific type 
of headgate with boards therein. Action was brought by 
the plaintiff to stop him from removing water from the 
ditch, claiming that the headgate and boards therein 
10 
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constituted a nuisance. The trial court held that although 
it did not give the defendant a right to any water of the 
plaintiff, the failure of the plaintiff to bring an action 
and to abate this nuisance for such a period of time, was 
such that this plaintiff had now lost his right to ask for 
equitable relief, and therein makes the statement that 
"One who slept on his rights will be denied equitable re-
lief." The Supreme Court of MO'ntana upheld this, and 
quotes the following cases in support of its position that 
abatement will not stand under an unreasonable period 
of time:. Thomas v. Woodman, 23 Kansas 217, 33 Ameri-
can Reports 156; Whitmore v. Brown, 102 Me. 47, 65 At-
lantic 516; Washington Lodge v. Frelinghuysen, 138 Mich. 
350, 101 N. W. 569, Bradbury Marble Co. v. Laclede Gas 
Light Co., 128 Missouri App. 96, 106 S. W. 594. 
In the matter of McMorran v. Cleveland, Cliff's Iron 
Co., 234 N.W. 163, 253 Mich. 65, there was a situation 
where a dock on which coal was stored and used to refuel 
the ships plying their trade on the Great Lakes was 
sought to be enjoined from its operation. The Supreme 
Court held that this matter was protected by laches. 
In the matter of O'Hair v. California Prune & Apricot 
Growers Association, 20 Pac. 2d 375, 130 Cal. P.L. 673, it 
was held that where a defendant operated a fruit process-
ing plant discharging waste water for 8 years into a sew-
er system which discharged into a slough flowing through 
plaintiff's land, plaintiff's laches barred damage action. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not err in dismissing the plaint-
iff's amended complaint. 
11 
Respectfully submitted, 
PATRICK H. FENTON 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Respondent 
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